To some, court dress is important.

Get­ting up and talk­ing in front of people is one of these activ­it­ies that does not often come nat­ur­ally. I have been doing in dif­fer­ent ways from around the age of 13 — the thick end of thirty years, now. I have done it in a wide range of forms — on stage in plays and pub­lic speak­ing com­pet­i­tions at school and uni­ver­sity. Present­a­tions to cli­ents and to audi­ences of peers at work–related con­fer­ences and events. I have pitched for work, I have spoken at fam­ily cel­eb­ra­tions. I have toasted friends and col­leagues, I have been the anonym­ous voice telling audi­ences what to do on leav­ing the theatre. You think I’d be used to it by now.

Not really. It’s true that skills become more finely–honed by prac­tice. It’s easi­er for me to flow whil­st speak­ing now — the words come easi­er, take a shape and a struc­ture, hit the points I wish to make and leave the audi­ence (I hope!) con­tent with what I have expressed and the way in which I have expressed it.

But I’m not a nat­ur­al pub­lic speak­er. The thought of stand­ing up and say­ing things to oth­er people used to scare the liv­ing day­lights out of me. Actu­ally doing it was not much bet­ter — and the win­dow just before start­ing was par­tic­u­larly hor­rible. It took an effort of will for me to stand out there and speak. Some people can do this without appar­ent effort. Most people can­not.

But one of the things that made it easi­er was the pre­par­a­tion. On the stage, I’m in cos­tume and makeup, per­form­ing the rôle. On a stage at a tech­nic­al con­fer­ence, I (now) have my own little rituals of pre­par­a­tion[1]. Even toast­ing my Dad’s birth­day, I still draw myself togeth­er, neaten the shirt, smooth the tie, pre­pare to be watched as much as listened to.

I read today that in the Supreme Court, that (if all advoc­ates agree) the wear­ing of form­al court dress — wig and gown — can be dis­pensed with. I fer­vently hope that this prac­tice is seen to be an excep­tion, and does not become exten­ded to the lower courts. There are sev­er­al reas­ons for me think­ing this.

Firstly, the fact that the justices of the Supreme Court do not wear robes or wigs is a his­tor­ic­al acci­dent. The beha­vi­our was impor­ted to the Supreme Court from its pre­de­cessor body, the Judi­cial Com­mit­tee of the House of Lords, which main­tained the fic­tion that it was not actu­ally a court and there­fore its mem­bers dressed in day dress, not court robes.

Secondly, there is no sci­en­tific­ally reli­able evid­ence on wheth­er any­one thinks how advoc­ates or judges dress (with one excep­tion) mat­ters. The excep­tion is the Fam­ily Court, where the require­ment to put vul­ner­able or young wit­nesses in as famil­i­ar an envir­on­ment as a court can be made to be, should (rightly, I believe) be para­mount. Apart from that though, there is no ser­i­ous stat­ist­ic­ally rig­or­ous research done on the ques­tion. And simplist­ic ques­tion­ing will get the simplist­ic answer. But the level of answer is only lim­ited by the ques­tion­er — I could frame a ques­tion that would get crim­in­al cases at the Crown Court heard by someone wear­ing a black track­ie, with lilac and red pip­ing, no prob­lem!

So now that change for his­tor­ic­al reas­ons and for per­cep­tion reas­ons are elim­in­ated, I want to set out my stand. As a very juni­or poten­tial future advoc­ate, I like the wig and robe. Even though I have nev­er worn one.

I believe it allows people to step bey­ond them­selves, and assume the rôle.

We are asked to take whatever case we are given, wheth­er we believe in it or not. We are asked to pro­sec­ute the poten­tially inno­cent and decent the poten­tially guilty, without fear or favour. The cab rank rule applies — we have no say in the cases that are given to us. And those are good and neces­sary things for the admin­is­tra­tion of justice. One of the coun­ter­bal­ances to this in my view, how­ever, is that it is import­ant, espe­cially for those new to advocacy, is to phys­ic­ally have the act of being the advoc­ate, and the act of becom­ing the indi­vidu­al again. The dis­tinc­tion between indi­vidu­al and job per­formed. And, for a lot of people (and I hope to be one of them) this is sig­ni­fied by the put­ting on of the wig and gown.

It’s the assump­tion of the rôle, the pre­par­at­ory step that takes you bey­ond your­self as an indi­vidu­al. The don­ning of the wig and gown is the phys­ic­al act that turns the per­son into the rôle. Game on, as it were.

At the levels of the Supreme Court, at which only the most com­pet­ent, the most in com­mand, the most skilled are ever likely to prac­tise — I can see that there is not neces­sar­ily any need for the advoc­ates and bar­ris­ters there to be in court dress. How­ever, in the lower courts, there are many people who take some com­fort in the wig and gown. I know I will. It may seem to be a trivi­al thing, an ana­chron­ism in this day and age. But to those who wear it and those who aspire to wear it, it can rep­res­ent some­thing that is the rep­res­ent­a­tion of some­thing more import­ant than them­selves as a per­son.

I real­ise this is an entirely emo­tion­al argu­ment, and one that can be eas­ily countered. Is it there­fore a just a cypher that I look up to? May­be I need to find another less phys­ic­al man­tra that allows me to go “game on”. But given that there is no stat­ist­ic­ally rig­or­ous evid­ence that any­one finds the wig and gown to be an issue (let alone com­par­at­ively how import­ant an issue), and given that I like its abil­ity to step me out of “me” and into what I need to do — let’s ignore this for a bit. I’ll keep the wig and gown I hope to wear, if that’s all right. I’ll ditch them in an instant if if any­one can prove that people think that mat­ters.

Take your change and keys out your pock­et. You won’t nervously play with them in your pock­et. For the love of god, think how it looks…”

Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance — where does this ultimately lead?

My gut instinct regard­ing my last post on Roy­al and Sun Alli­ance Insurance’s busi­ness struc­ture increas­ing the costs of acci­dent repair was that it was unlikely to be the end of the mat­ter. Per­mis­sion had been gran­ted to appeal; I fully expec­ted to see the mat­ter be resolved there. But that would only determ­ine the law as it applied to the fac­tu­al mat­rix of the case in ques­tion. That approach would be unlikely to help oth­er cases much — it would be open to argue that the fac­tu­al mat­rix was suf­fi­ciently dif­fer­ent that the appeal judg­ment did not apply. This clearly would not address the core ques­tion.

Provid­ent Insur­ance has decided though to take a dif­fer­ent approach: to seek determ­in­a­tion from the Com­mer­cial Court — a spe­cial­ist branch of the Queen’s Bench Divi­sion of the High Court — as to wheth­er RSAI’s com­mer­cial mod­el is leg­ally cor­rect. In the case I last wro­te about, it was held (at County Court level) that it was not, but clearly there has been a dif­fer­ence of opin­ion between County Courts. RSAI has agreed that it’s desir­able that its busi­ness prac­tice in ques­tion be tested for leg­al­ity.

So in Coles & Ors v Heth­er­ton & Ors [2011] EWCH 2405 (Comm) Provid­ent and RSAI have both brought claims between them­selves in the High Court itself (nor­mally they are pre­cluded from doing so because of the likely size of award), and trans­ferred in cases from the County Courts. The next step will be the selec­tion of lead cases in this mat­ter.

This is all at a very early stage, but it has poten­tially far–reaching effects. The lead cases will determ­ine the shape of the case as it will be heard, but there are more situ­ations than just vehicle repair paid by an insurer where a corporation’s intern­al group struc­ture can lead to addi­tion­al costs being passed to the per­son who ulti­mately pays. In the case pre­vi­ously men­tioned it was entirely unclear why addi­tion­al costs were levied by the inter­me­di­ate insurer–owned com­pany, and this is why some County Courts have rejec­ted such addi­tion­al costs.

How­ever, there could be poten­tial situ­ations where such addi­tion­al char­ging was trans­par­ent, and also neces­sit­ated by a busi­ness struc­ture chosen for legit­im­ate oth­er reas­ons, for example tax min­im­isa­tion. Wheth­er increas­ing the cost to the end con­sumer in order to achieve an unre­lated advant­age­ous fin­an­cial out­come for the com­pany as a whole is the ulti­mate ques­tion here, and one that is very inter­est­ing indeed.

Case Comment: Fallows v Harkers Transport (Royal and Sun Alliance, vehicle insurance)

Mr Fal­lows’ car was dam­aged by a vehicle owned by the defend­ants. Liab­il­ity was not an issue. Mr. Fal­lows’ vehicle was insured by Roy­al and Sun Alli­ance, who sought to recov­er their costs from the defendant’s insurers. The costs were £1825.53. Not a large sum. How­ever, the defend­ants objec­ted.

The reas­on for the objec­tion was that Roy­al and Sun Alli­ance arranged repair via a wholly-owned sub­si­di­ary, which then con­trac­ted with a sub­con­tract­or, who actu­ally repaired the vehicle. The sub­con­tract­or billed the sub­si­di­ary the sum of £1542.78. The sub­si­di­ary added on fur­ther costs, and billed Roy­al and Sun Alli­ance.

In Rom­ford County Court, the defend­ants ques­tioned the sum claimed. It was held that, given the duty to mit­ig­ate, the best evid­ence of reas­on­able cost of repairs was that which RSA’s sub­si­di­ary nego­ti­ated with the sub­con­tract­or. There was no evid­ence that RSA itself could only nego­ti­ate a higher price. While admin­is­tra­tion costs have been allowed by the courts in the past, there are no decisions allow­ing them to a sub­rog­ated insurer, let alone a sub­rog­ated insurer’s sub­sid­ary. And in coun­ter­bal­ance, there are decisions where admin­is­tra­tion costs have been dis­al­lowed.

The Judge (Platt J) said:

Since RSAARL is wholly owned by RSA the effect of these extra charges if they are paid by defend­ants is simply to boost RSA Group’s profits bey­ond the actu­al cost of repair by the mar­gins inser­ted by RSAARL. I can find no basis in law for say­ing that this is a course of action which a claimant insurer is entitled to take [..]. On the evid­ence the defend­ant has clearly estab­lished a fail­ure to mit­ig­ate on the part of the claimant.

Now that this judg­ment is pub­lic, the util­ity of this busi­ness arrange­ment to RSA is prob­ably moot. Oth­er insurers could use the same mod­el. This how­ever was found to be likely to lead to an increase in costs to the insured mem­bers of the pub­lic of some 25%.

RSA were held liable in costs to the defend­ant — exceed­ingly unusu­al in a small claim. Even though they were the claimant, they almost com­pletely failed to com­ply with pre–action pro­to­col and with the court–ordered dis­cov­ery pro­cess. For example, the exist­ence of a form­al invoice from the repairer to RSA’s sub­si­di­ary was not dis­closed, even once its exist­ence had become appar­ent dur­ing the tri­al.

Per­mis­sion was given to appeal.

Judg­ment in the case can be found on BAILII at Fal­lows v. Hark­ers Trans­port (A Firm) [2011] EW Misc 16.

Your data in the Cloud is not secure from the US Government

Data stor­age in the cloud is clearly the where things are mov­ing just now. Given the pleth­ora of devices people have — com­puters at home, laptops and tab­lets on the move, smart­phones in the pock­et, it makes per­fect sense for all of a person’s devices to use a single, com­mon repos­it­ory for shared inform­a­tion. Ser­vices such as Apple’s forth­com­ing iCloud at the domest­ic level, and commonly–used ser­vices such as Google’s Google Apps, Salesforce.com and Microsoft’s Office 365 all store your data in their own clouds.

You’d think that this would be done with respect to Data Pro­tec­tion laws. Wrong. If the USA wants your data, the USA gets it. My friends Simon Bis­son and Mary Branscombe have the details: regard­less of European pri­vacy dir­ect­ives and the UK Data pro­tec­tion act, the US see the PATRIOT act over­rid­ing these for US com­pan­ies and EU sub­si­di­ar­ies of US com­pan­ies:

That means that US gov­ern­ment can (under the aus­pices of the act) request the data of any indi­vidu­al or com­pany that’s using US-owned or hos­ted ser­vices, no mat­ter where that data is actu­ally being held. It doesn’t mat­ter if you’ve geo-locked your data, and it only resides in European data centres, it can still be requisi­tioned and taken to the US. Yes, it’s an issue of nation­al secur­ity, but when res­ults can be found by machine learn­ing and trawl­ing massive data sets (the lar­ger the bet­ter), there’s a tempta­tion for gov­ern­ments to take all they can and more.

Undoubtedly this will lead to much hand–wringing in the EU Par­lia­ment. How­ever, what can be done? It is unlikely that the USA will give up their powers.

There­fore, the only solu­tion is in the hands of indi­vidu­als and com­pan­ies wish­ing to use cloud ser­vices — only use cloud ser­vices from wholly–EU–owned com­pan­ies host­ing your data inside the EU. While the leg­al pro­tec­tions you will have in those cir­cum­stances are not huge, they are bet­ter than none at all.

Oh — an after­thought. How happy do you now feel, if per­haps you have just given a whole heap of your per­son­al inform­a­tion to Google, dur­ing the Google Plus sign–up pro­cess?

Hookway — I was there

Back in the middle of may, I had just fin­ished study­ing my judi­cial review mod­ules on my law course, and I thought it would be a good use of a free day to head to court to see judi­cial review in prac­tice. As luck would have it, there was a case lis­ted that day, the 16th May, at Manchester Civil Justice Centre:

R (Chief Con­stable of Manchester Police) v Salford City Magis­trates, case CO/3649/2011

Inter­est­ing, thought I. There had been a few cases in my notes where a decision of a Magis­trates Court had been judi­cially reviewed, but not any on the behest of the police. I decided to attend.

Of course, this case is now known as Hook­way. I really couldn’t have chosen a bet­ter case to sit in upon, in terms of its reper­cus­sions.

The prob­lem high­lighted by the case can be sum­mar­ised pretty quickly. Once the police arrest someone, they only have a cer­tain num­ber of hours to ques­tion them before they must be released. That time can be exten­ded, but only to a point. The ques­tion is, when a per­son is released on bail, is the “clock” still run­ning, or has it been paused?
It has been police prac­tice to assume the lat­ter as long as the cur­rent régime, intro­duced in the Police and Crim­in­al Evid­ence Act 1984, has been in for­ce; but the sec­tions in ques­tion — 41 to 47 — are remark­ably unclear, and in fact make no men­tion of the clock stop­ping.

In the court itself, there were eight people. Mr Justice McCombe, the court clerk, one ush­er, two police­men, one police soli­cit­or, Ms. A Whyte QC, and me. Salford Magis­trates and Paul Hook­way were not rep­res­en­ted.

Every­one in the courtroom that day knew this applic­a­tion was dif­fi­cult, and that it had con­sequences. Every­one was fully aware that the reper­cus­sions of uphold­ing the lower court’s rul­ing would be far–reaching. Ms. Whyte QC ably led the court through the com­plex­it­ies of the legis­la­tion, point­ing out, entirely fairly given that the defend­ants did not appear, the per­spect­ive from both sides of the argu­ment. There was abso­lutely no pre­vi­ous author­ity on the ques­tion, and only one aca­dem­ic work (which was not on point to the ques­tion at hand). The Judge and Ms Whyte slowly and care­fully picked their way through the six rel­ev­ant sec­tions of the act, tak­ing over two hours to do so.

It was hugely inter­est­ing to watch these people dis­sect­ing the sec­tions of the act in vari­ous ways, try­ing to tease out the pre­cise mean­ing of the words of the act. Ser­i­ous people, at a ser­i­ous task.

Sadly, I was unable to attend the handing–down of the judg­ment, which happened on Thursday the 19th May. The judg­ment wasn’t made pub­lic until the middle of June — and then, of course, there has been the usu­al raft of pub­li­city. While there has been some reas­on­able cov­er­age in the press, it’s sad to see that cov­er­age des­cen­ded rap­idly in the BBC and the Guard­i­an.

Today, two devel­op­ments have occurred. The Supreme Court have turned down a request for a stay of the rul­ing, pri­or to their hear­ing an appeal from it on the 25th of July. And on Thursday, the Gov­ern­ment are intro­du­cing legis­la­tion to over­turn the rul­ing.

While the details of the legis­la­tion are yet to be pub­lished, it is very likely that they will change the law to how it was believed to be pri­or to the rul­ing in Hook­way. This may be a missed oppor­tun­ity. Let­ters in the Guard­i­an sug­gest police bail can be abused, by the impos­i­tion of restric­tions dur­ing bail. Rather than enact in law a patch to re-estab­lish the status quo, might it be time to take a long look at the legis­la­tion sur­round­ing arrest, deten­tion and bail, and re–enact it to get rid of its incon­sist­en­cies, lack of clar­ity, and exploits?

More on media responsibility and injunctions

A month or so ago I wro­te an art­icle on here about how the rise in injunc­tions gran­ted pro­tect­ing the iden­tity of the parties was the fault of the tabloids, and it’s good to see that in writ­ing that, I was agree­ing with the views of Steph­en Sed­ley, the recently–retired judge of the Court of Appeal.

In an art­icle in the Lon­don Review of Books: The Good­win and Giggs Show (which I found via Roy Greenslade’s blog entry about it in the Guard­i­an) he says: 

The nam­ing of Good­win and Giggs is on a dif­fer­ent plane from min­is­teri­al brief­ings again­st judges, inap­pro­pri­ate as these are, because it dis­rupts the his­tor­ic equi­lib­ri­um between the judi­ciary and the legis­lature. The media may present them­selves as amused spec­tat­ors, but it is they who have pro­voked and exploited the break­down of an ele­ment in the demo­cracy they them­selves inhab­it.

A sen­ti­ment with which I whole­heartedly agree. And rather than sort out this per­fectly obvi­ous ele­phant in the room, seni­or politi­cians spend their time attack­ing the judges, rather than the media:

This is why the issues are large. It can be cred­ibly said that the fourth estate is close to being a state with­in the state, unreg­u­lated except to the mod­est extent that it chooses to reg­u­late itself and altern­ately feared and pandered to by pub­lic fig­ures.

Form­al reg­u­la­tion, I’d sug­gest, is over­due.

Mind you, in the UK at least we have the back­ground of some pro­tec­tion via the right to pri­vacy enshrined via Art­icle 8 of the European Con­ven­tion on Human Rights. A per­son whom I fol­low on twit­ter re–tweeted this link to an blog post by pop­star and new mum Pink, com­plain­ing about paparazzi try­ing to grab pho­tos of her new daugh­ter. At least in the UK and Europe that (fol­low­ing the case brought by JK Rowl­ing for breach of her son’s pri­vacy) is not allowed.

And in related news to do with the media: jury dis­charged before con­sid­er­ing wheth­er Levi Belfield abduc­ted Rachel Cowles because of adverse pub­li­city over his con­vic­tion of the murder of Milly Dowl­er. They couldn’t even wait until ver­dicts were brought in on all charges. The media simply don’t care about justice, or you — it’s all about the story.

BAILII needs help

My road toward the law has been long and not dir­ect — but one web site in par­tic­u­lar kept my interest when I wasn’t sure what I wanted to do. Given my sci­ence back­ground and near–obsessive need for inform­a­tion, you may not be sur­prised that the site is BAILII.

BAILII is a data­base of case law. It con­tains recent decisions for the full range of courts and tribunals across the UK, his­tor­ic decisions, and decisions from oth­er jur­is­dic­tions. It is free to access, and the best way in the UK for the lay per­son to access case law, giv­ing the abil­ity to inform them­selves about things like leg­al mat­ters in the press, but more import­antly giv­ing the abil­ity to research and arm them­selves in situ­ations where there can be little oth­er help — a dis­pute with a pub­lic body, or an employ­er, for example.

Run­ning BAILII is nat­ur­ally not free. While a num­ber of firms have made com­mit­ments to fund­ing, more is required to guar­an­tee the con­tinu­ing sur­viv­al of what, to me, is an essen­tial ser­vice. Frankly, I think it should be a publicly–funded ser­vice, but that is not likely in this day and age.

If, like me, you believe this ser­vice should con­tin­ue, please con­sider donat­ing to BAILII. It is a char­ity, dona­tions are man­aged via the Char­it­ies Aid Found­a­tion, and are gift-aidable (please do that if you can, it means an extra 25% to them).

News from the Florida Justice System

A man who killed two Brit­ish tour­ists in Flor­ida will not go to jail — even though he fled the scene and lied to the police. Ryan LeV­in paid an undis­closed amount to the wid­ows of those he killed, and will serve two years house arrest.

The offences’ sen­ten­cing guidelines call for up for 45 years’ impris­on­ment.

His law­yer was the Judge’s deputy cam­paign treas­urer.

For all people com­plain about the UK justice sys­tem, I’m glad that it’s pretty much as it is.

Alex Salmond’s criticism of the UK Supreme Court is grandstanding

So, Mr. Sal­mond would like to see the removal of the Supreme Court’s power to decide Human Rights issues with regard to the Scot­tish crim­in­al justice sys­tem. Moreover, he has chosen to per­son­al­ise the issue by attack­ing Lord Hope, the deputy pres­id­ent of the Supreme Court, and pre­vi­ously lord justice gen­er­al of Scot­land. The situ­ation has become so far­cic­al that the Scot­tish Gov­ern­ment, led by the SNP, are look­ing at remov­ing fund­ing for the Supreme Court.

Loads of heat and noise there, again­st a tar­get that, to retain its impar­ti­al­ity, does not involve itself in polit­ics. It’s easy to shoot at some­thing that won’t shoot back, isn’t it?

Any­way, the changes the SNP are pro­pos­ing will not mean that decisions of the Scot­tish crim­in­al courts will not be prone to any review — it will mean that, as before the intro­duc­tion of the Scot­land Act and the Human Rights Act, Human Rights chal­lenges to it will have to go to the European Court of Human Rights in Stras­bourg rather to the UK Supreme Court. This will of course mean con­sid­er­able delay com­pared to now. And on the European Court of Human Rights there are pre­cisely no judges with extens­ive under­stand­ing of the Scot­tish crim­in­al justice sys­tem. On the UK Supreme Court, there are two — Lord Hope and Lord Rodger, who is unfor­tu­nately ill at the moment.

What Alex Sal­mond is doing is trans­par­ent — and it has noth­ing at all to do with the qual­ity of justice in Scot­land, or the rest of the UK. Sal­mond, as lead­er of the Scot­tish Nation­al Party, has just won a major­ity in the Scot­tish Par­lia­ment. His party are com­mit­ted to a ref­er­en­dum on wheth­er Scot­land should be inde­pend­ent or not in the lat­ter half of this par­lia­ment­ary ses­sion. It is there­fore to his advant­age to cri­ti­cise decisions made by oth­ers that affect Scot­land — it’s the old “them and us” ploy. While Mr Sal­mond has always had a tend­ency to play the “poor down­trod­den Scots” card at every oppor­tun­ity, to per­son­al­ise the attack again­st the Scot who, with the oth­er mem­bers of the Supreme Court, is the last bas­tion again­st Human Rights-based mis­car­riages of crim­in­al justice in Scot­land, is rep­re­hens­ible.

What we should really be ques­tion­ing here is the decisions of the High Court of Jus­ti­ci­ary in Edin­burgh. In both their judg­ment in Fraser and HMA v McLean (the fore­run­ner to Cad­der) — the lat­ter with a bench of no less than sev­en justices — they have got a point of Human Rights law wrong. What is caus­ing this dif­fi­culty in cor­rectly ana­lys­ing wheth­er aspects of the Scot­tish crim­in­al justice sys­tem is com­pli­ant with the Con­ven­tion on Human Rights?

Anonymity injunctions protect other people, too

News Group tried to get CTB’s anonym­ity injunc­tion lis­ted last night, after John Hem­ming MP named the per­son in Par­lia­ment.

While Tugend­hat J’s rul­ing unfor­tu­nately kinda con­firms that (via jig­saw iden­ti­fic­a­tion) we all know who CTB is now, the third para­graph in the rul­ing — CTB v News Group News­pa­pers Ltd [2011] EWCH 1334 — bears repeat­ing. The injunc­tions are not just for the bene­fit of the claimant.

It is obvi­ous that if the pur­pose of this injunc­tion were to pre­serve a secret, it would have failed in its pur­pose. But in so far as its pur­pose is to pre­vent intru­sion or har­ass­ment, it has not failed. The fact that tens of thou­sands of people have named the claimant on the inter­net con­firms that the claimant and his fam­ily need pro­tec­tion from intru­sion into their private and fam­ily life. The fact that a ques­tion has been asked in Par­lia­ment seems to me to increase, and not to dimin­ish the strength of his case that he and his fam­ily need that pro­tec­tion. The order has not pro­tec­ted the claimant and his fam­ily from taunt­ing on the inter­net. It is still effect­ive to pro­tect them from taunt­ing and oth­er intru­sion and har­ass­ment in the print media.

(my emphas­is)

It could be sim­pler if news­pa­per apo­lo­gies had to take up the same num­ber of square inches of the paper as the ori­gin­al offend­ing article(s). The cost of such an apo­logy might be the only thing that may make them focus on stor­ies of pub­lic interest, rather than on feed­ing on the profit gained by the gen­er­al public’s pruri­ence. It has a cer­tain poet­ic justice that I like, too.